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SHELTERING THE HOMELESS: JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL
DUTIES TO THE POOR
KENNETH M. CHACKES*
INTRODUCTION
Lacking the basic necessities of life, health, and safety, homeless peo-
ple in America are the poorest of the poor. Many states have imposed
upon themselves or their political subdivisions the duty to care for poor
inhabitants. This article explores the enforceability of these govern-
mental duties as a means of obtaining assistance for the homeless.
Who are the homeless of this country? Their unifying characteristic
is a lack of permanent residence, I although a broad definition includes
persons living in unsafe or unsanitary housing.' In addition to the
stereotypic alcoholic man and bag lady, homeless people include grow-
ing numbers of poor women, children, and families; unemployed able-
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.
B.A. 1971, Tulane University; J.D. 1976, St. Louis University. The author is an
attorney for plaintiffs in Graham v. Schoemehl, one of the homeless cases discussed in
this article, and is a member of the St. Louis Homeless Services Network Board. The
author acknowledges the helpful comments of Professors Stephen Legomsky, Daniel
Mandelker, and Jules Gerard, and the valuable research assistance of Ellen Blau and
Nancy Stenn.
1. Erickson & Wilhelm, Introduction, in HOUSING THE HOMELESS xix, xxvii (J.
Erickson & C. Wilhelm eds. 1986) [hereinafter HOUSING THE HOMELESS]; U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Services, Program Design and Management, in HOUSING THE
HOMELESS, supra, at 389.
2. See, e.g., Graham v. Schoemehl, No. 854-00035 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 15, 1985)
(consent decree).
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bodied men; physically and mentally disabled persons; and battered
and abused women.3
Those who study homelessness attribute its existence to several ma-
jor factors: general economic conditions and unemployment,4 reduc-
tions in government benefits,5 deinstitutionalization of mental
patients,6 shortages of low-cost housing,7 and family breakdown and
domestic violence.'
As characteristics of the homeless population and causes of home-
lessness vary, so do the needs of homeless people. Their common need
is shelter-a temporary or permanent residence.9 Homeless people
also need relief from many other problems. They are likely to suffer
from inadequate food and nutrition, a clothing shortage, physical vio-
lence and sexual victimization, poor physical and mental health, alco-
holism or alcohol abuse, and inadequate job and life skills.10
Efforts to ameliorate the problems of the homeless focus on either
prevention or short- and long-term cures. 1 This article deals with one
3. Kaufman, Homelessness: A Comprehensive Policy Approach, in HOUSING THE
HOMELESS, supra note 1, at 336; Sexton, The Life of the Homeless, in HOUSING THE
HOMELESS, supra note 1, at 76-77; U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, supra note
1, at 389. Estimates of the number of homeless in the United States range from 250,000
to 3,000,000. Erickson & Wilhelm, supra note 1, at xix.
4. Erickson & Wilhelm, supra note 1, at xxiii; Bassuk, The Homeless Problem, in
HOUSING THE HOMELESS, supra note 1, at 254; Hope & Young, The Politics of Dis-
placement: Sinking into Homelessness, in HOUSING THE HOMELESS, supra note 1, at
107.
5. Erickson & Wilhelm, supra note 1, at xxiv; Bassuk, supra note 4, at 254; Hope &
Young, supra note 4, at 107-09.
6. Collin, Homelessness: The Policy and the Law, 16 URB. LAW. 317, 318 (1984);
Erickson & Wilhelm, supra note 1, at xxiv; Bassuk, supra note 4, at 254; Hope &
Young, supra note 4, at 107; Kaufman, supra note 3, at 336; Stoner, The Plight of
Homeless Women, in HOUSING THE HOMELESS, supra note 1, at 280.
7. Erickson & Wilhelm, supra note 1, at xxiv-xxv; Bassuk, supra note 4, at 254;
Kaufman, supra note 6, at 336; Stoner, supra note 6, at 280.
8. Erickson & Wilhelm, supra note 1, at xxv; Stoner, supra note 6, at 280.
9. "Homeless men and women suffer from multiple problems in addition to their
lack of housing, but providing decent shelter remains the crucial first step in the process
of returning stability and dignity to their lives." Sloss, The Crisis of Homelessness: Its
Dimensions and Solutions, 17 URB. & Soc. CHANGE REv. 18 (1984). "Stated simply,
being homeless, in and of itself, is the most fundamental and critical problem of home-
lessness." G. Morse, Homelessness: A Multilevel Assessment and Intervention Strat-
egy 89 (Sept. 30, 1984) (specialty paper) (emphasis in original).
10. Morse, supra note 9, at 90-91; U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, supra
note 1, at 389.
11. Policy or program options to help the homeless generally fall within four areas:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/8
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curative strategy: litigation. Litigation aimed primarily at the immedi-
ate and life-threatening problems of the homeless-the need for shelter,
food, clothing, personal security, and health care-is only one of many
ways to approach the problem. This is not a complete solution because
litigation cannot fully address the many causes of homelessness. 2 Liti-
gation takes time, and the implementation of judicially imposed reme-
dies can be difficult. 13  Private nongovernmental efforts 4  and
legislative approaches"5 may provide additional solutions.
Despite the limitations of litigation, several recent lawsuits brought
in state courts by and on behalf of homeless people produced positive
results.' 6 Courts have recognized and enforced governmental duties
under state law to provide shelter and other life-sustaining services to
those who need them. Moreover, lawsuits raise the public conscious-
ness and attract the attention of public officials.17
Part I of this article examines the general principles involved in state
prevention; short-term emergency shelter and other life and health sustaining services;
transitional services such as long-term residential placement, health care, employment
training and assistance, and permanent housing search; and permanent housing. Erick-
son & Wilhelm, supra note 1, at xxvii-xxix.
12. Collin, supra note 6, at 328; Fabricant & Epstein, Legal and Welfare Rights
Advocacy: Complementary Approaches in Organizing on Behalf of the Homeless, 17
URB. & SOC. CHANGE REv. 15, 17-19 (1984). Some litigation efforts, however, have
focused on the causes of homelessness. See HOMELESSNESS TASK FORCE, HOMELESS-
NESS IN AMERICA: A LITIGATION MEMORANDUM FOR LEGAL SERVICES ADVOCATES
(July 1986) (distributed by National Clearinghouse for Legal Services, Inc.).
13. Collin, supra note 6, at 325; Fabricant & Epstein, supra note 12, at 16.
14. See Fabricant & Epstein, supra note 12, at 17-19; Gillerman, County to Get First
Shelter for Homeless, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 3, 1986, at 3W.
15. See Collin, supra note 6, at 328-29; but see Birkinshaw, Homelessness and the
Law-the Effects and Response to Legislation, 5 URB. L. & POL'Y 255 (1982) (describ-
ing the limited success of England's Housing (Homeless Persons) Act of 1977).
16. See infra notes 114-85 and accompanying text. "In New York city, litigation
has proven to be a uniquely effective tool in promoting the cause of homeless men and
women." Hopper & Cox, Litigation in Advocacy for the Homeless, in HOUSING THE
HOMELESS, supra note 1, at 305. See also Stille, Seeking Shelter in the Law, Nat'l L.J.,
Feb. 10, 1986, at 1.
17. See Collin, supra note 6, at 328; Sloss, supra note 9, at 19-20. Sloss states:
Developing political power and establishing legal precedents have been important
to poor people's struggles for civil rights and economic justice, and the case of the
homeless is no different....
In the absence of legal decisions establishing the rights of homeless to decent
homes, all levels of government can turn their backs on the homeless as they have
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court actions to enforce individual rights against government entities
and officials. It also discusses the justiciability issues that often arise
when the judiciary is called on to review and remedy the conduct of
another branch of government. In the context of homeless litigation,
the resolution of these issues plays a significant role in determining
whether courts will reach the merits of a claim, and if so, how far they
will go in fashioning relief. Part II explores state constitutional and
statutory provisions that establish governmental duties to relieve the
poor, and examines private litigation efforts to enforce the rights cre-
ated by those provisions. In Part III, this article analyzes litigation
that has been pursued under those state poor laws by homeless people
seeking shelter and other services from government defendants. This
article concludes in Part IV with suggested approaches to the jus-
ticiability issues and remedial questions that often arise in homeless
litigation.
I. STATE COURT ENFORCEMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL
DuTiEs IN GENERAL
A person seeking to challenge the action or inaction of a state or
local government official or entity must resort to one of the extraordi-
nary writs such as injunction and mandamus, unless a procedure for
judicial review is prescribed by statute. 8 This part will discuss the
general requirements for those remedies and the limits on judicial au-
thority to interfere with the functions of other branches of government.
A. Requirements for Mandatory Injunctive Relief Against State or
Local Governments
The general principles that state courts apply, or at least articulate,
in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief are well settled. The deci-
sion whether to grant an injunction lies within the discretion of the
court. In making this decision, however, the court must adhere to the
general principles of equity, taking into account the facts and circum-
stances of each case. 19
In general, a plaintiff seeking an injunction must establish four ele-
ments: (1) a violation of a clear legal right, or an imminent threat of
18. D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH & P. SALSICH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 767 (2d ed. 1983).
19. See Hudson v. School Dist., 578 S.W.2d 301, 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). See also
State ex rel. Danforth v. W.E. Constr. Co., 552 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/8
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such violation; (2) threat of irreparable injury; (3) no adequate remedy
at law; and (4) a balance of equities in his or her favor.2" Even in cases
in which a plaintiff establishes these four elements, a court may refuse
injunctive relief if it is not in the public interest.21
Courts frequently distinguish between mandatory and prohibitory
injunctions. A mandatory injunction compels the performance of an
action or duty, while a prohibitory injunction requires that one refrain
from performing a particular action or duty.22 Courts are generally
reluctant to issue mandatory injunctions, 23 particularly when the de-
fendant is a government entity or official. Courts sometimes state a
general rule that they will not issue injunctions to regulate the manner
and method of performance of official duties24 and will not enjoin gov-
ernment entities or officials in the exercise of their discretionary pow-
ers. 25  This reluctance is important in homeless cases in which the
preferred relief is usually a mandatory injunction directed against a
public official. When presented with a justiciable controversy, how-
ever, courts issue mandatory injunctions against government entities
and officials in two categories of cases: when a public official or gov-
20. Hudson, 578 S.W.2d at 312; J. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNC-
TIONS Ch. I §§ 8, 9, 22, 28 (4th ed. 1905).
21. J. HIGH, supra note 20, Ch. I.
22. See Barton v. Eichelberger, 311 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 451 F.2d
263 (3d Cir. 1971); Singleton v. Anson County Bd. of Educ., 283 F. Supp. 895
(W.D.N.C. 1968); J. HIGH, supra note 20, Ch. I § 2.
The distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions is not always clear.
A court may order a defendant to stop something, such as a nuisance, when the defend-
ant must actually take positive action to comply with the court order. United States v.
City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977).
23. See, e.g., Hudson, 578 S.W.2d at 312; Board of Educ. v. Pomeroy, 47 Inl. App.
3d 468, 474, 362 N.E.2d 55, 60 (1977). As is the case with a prohibitory injunction, the
decision to grant or deny relief in the form of a mandatory injunction rests within the
court's discretion. Id. at 474, 362 N.E.2d at 60. A court will not issue a mandatory
injunction if the defendant could not comply with it. Hudson, 578 S.W.2d at 312 n.1
(citing Hribernik v. Reorganized School Dist. R-3, 276 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App.
1955)).
24. See Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Wade, 651 S.W.2d
927, 929 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); see also Rocke v. County of Cook, 60 Ill. App. 3d 874,
377 N.E.2d 287 (1978).
25. See Evans v. Just Open Gov't, 242 Ga. 834, 836, 251 S.E.2d 546, 549 (1979);
City of Hammond v. N.I.D. Corp., 435 N.E.2d 42, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Weber v.
City of Sachse, 591 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); J. HIGH, supra note 20, Chs.
XXI § 1240, XXII § 1326.
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
160 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 31:155
ernment entity fails to perform a non-discretionary duty,2 6 and when
the defendant's conduct amounts to an abuse of discretion.27
B. Requirements for Mandamus Against State or
Local Government Officials
A writ of mandamus is a legal remedy that compels a government
official to perform a duty imposed by law.2 8 Although it is a legal rem-
edy, the principles of equity usually govern a proceeding for a writ of
mandamus.2 9 The basic requirements for obtaining a writ of manda-
mus are a clear legal right on the part of the plaintiff, a corresponding
duty that the defendant must perform, and the absence of an alterna-
tive remedy at law.3" Traditionally, mandamus was available only to
compel the performance of ministerial acts and duties.31 Although
there may be some ambiguities in the term, a ministerial act is an act
that a government official must perform in a prescribed manner when
certain circumstances are present, without regard to the official's judg-
ment or discretion.3z
When governmental action is mandatory and involves the exercise of
discretion, mandamus may compel a public official to act, but it is not
available to dictate the particular action the official must take.33 Like
an injunction, however, a plaintiff may use mandamus when a public
26. See, e.g., Adams v. Nagle, 303 U.S. 532 (1983); Weber, 591 S.W.2d at 567; J.
HIGH, supra note 20, Ch. XXII § 1310.
27. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
28. See Huser v. Duck Creek Watershed (Joint) Dist. No. 59, 234 Kan. 1, 4, 668
P.2d 172, 176 (1983); Sutton v. Figgatt, 280 N.C. 89, 93, 185 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1971); J.
HIGH, supra note 20, Ch. XXII § 1310.
29. See Orange County v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 385,
265 S.E.2d 890, 913 (1980). See also 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 19 (1969).
30. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. Commw. 73, 76, 480 A.2d
1330, 1331 (1984).
31. See Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 539, 463 N.E.2d 588, 595, 475
N.Y.S.2d 247, 254 (1984); but cf. Legal Aid Soc'y v. Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 12, 16 n.1,
422 N.E.2d 542, 544 n.1, 439 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884 n.I (1981); Board of Edue. of Niles
Township High School Dist. No. 219 v. Board of Educ. of Northfield Township High
School Dist. No. 225, 112 Ill. App. 3d 212, 219, 445 N.E.2d 464, 470 (1983).
32. See Huser, 232 Kan. at 4, 668 P.2d at 176; Oyler v. State, 618 P.2d 1042, 1048-
49 (Wyo. 1980).
33. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 34 N.C. App. 619, 636-37, 240 S.E.2d
460, 470 (1977); County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. Commw. 73, 76, 480
A.2d 1330, 1332 (1984).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/8
GOVERNMENTAL DUTIES TO THE HOMELESS
official has abused his or her discretion.3 4
An important difference between a mandatory injunction and a writ
of mandamus is an injunction's ability to prescribe a detailed course of
action. In homeless litigation, either remedy can be issued to order
governments to comply with their legal duties to the poor, but only an
injunction can provide detailed directives ordering governments what
to do and how to do it.
35
C. Limits on Judicial Authority to Intrude into Matters Entrusted to
Other Branches of Government
When plaintiffs ask courts to intrude in areas involving the conduct
of government officials, as in homeless litigation, courts sometimes
hold that they lack subject matter jurisdiction. These courts articulate
one or more of the overlapping doctrines of separation of powers, jus-
ticiability, sovereign immunity, or political question as the basis for
such a result.36 The issue can arise at the liability stage or the relief
stage of litigation. At the liability stage, a government might assert
that the challenged conduct is not subject to judicial review because it
involves the exercise of discretion. At the relief stage, plaintiffs might
34. Many courts have indicated that no practical difference exists between the reme-
dies of injunction and mandamus. Sutton, 280 N.C. at 92, 185 S.E.2d at 98 (1971);
West v. Board of County Comm'rs, 373 So. 2d 83, 86 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Monroe v. Middlebury Conservation Comm'n, 187 Conn. 476, 447 A.2d 1, 3 (1982);
Orange County, 46 N.C. Ct. App. at 385, 265 S.E.2d at 912-13. In jurisdictions in
which the distinction between equity and law is observed, however, significant distinc-
tions may exist between the two remedies. Lyle v. City of Chicago, 357 111. 41, 191 N.E.
255, 256-57 (1934). Some courts express the view that mandamus is available to compel
performance or cure a default, while an injunction is the appropriate remedy to restrain
action or to prevent threatened or anticipated harm. Id. In some states mandamus is
considered a remedy at law that precludes the issuance of an injunction. Board of Educ.
v. Pomeroy, 47 Ill. App. 3d 468, 474, 362 N.E.2d 55, 60 (1977).
35. See infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
36. For example, the court asserted separation of powers as a basis for lack of juris-
diction or denial of relief in Lap v. Thibault, 348 So. 2d 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Wade, 651 S.W.2d 927, 929-30
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983); and Denver Police Protective Ass'n v. City of Denver, 6 65 P.2d
150, 151 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983). The court in Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d at 536-37, 463
N.E.2d at 594-94, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 252-53, dealt with the doctrines of justiciability,
separation of powers, and political question. The defendants argued that sovereign im-
munity barred judicial intrusion into matters committed to the discretion of government
officials in Houseknecht v. Zagel, 112 Ill. App. 3d 284, 289-90, 445 N.E.2d 402, 406
(1983), and Orange County, 46 N.C. App. at 377-38, 265 S.E.2d at 908-09. See also
infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text (discussion of doctrines of justiciability, sepa-
ration of powers, and political question).
1987]
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ask a court to order a public official to act in a particular way. A
government might then argue that the nature of the relief sought will
require the court to make choices it lacks the authority or the compe-
tence to make.
1. Judicial Review of Discretionary Official Conduct
When the challenged governmental action involves the exercise of
discretion, a court must determine whether the issues are justiciable.
The principle that courts should not intrude into areas committed to
the coordinate branches of government is part of the concept of jus-
ticiability and central to the separation of powers doctrine.37 This
principle, known as the political question doctrine, is an aspect of jus-
ticiability that arises in cases involving the enforceability of rights
against officials or departments of the legislative or executive
branches.38 Courts' refusal to resolve political questions stems from
both the separation of powers doctrine and the courts' general unwill-
ingness to get involved in areas in which they lack competence. 3
9
Though a substantial disagreement exists over the scope, rationale,
and existence of the political question doctrine,'40 courts rely on it in
determining -whether to exercise jurisdiction.41 The United States
Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr42 stands as a basic exposi-
tion of the political question doctrine.43 According to Baker, courts
should not decide questions that the Constitution explicitly commits to
another branch of government, that require the application of stan-
dards or the determination of policy choices not suited to judicial deci-
37. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-7 (1987). Professor Tribe
indicates that the concept of justiciability is derived from the constitutional limitation
on judicial power, and implicates both the necessity for an adversary and judicially
resolvable controversy and the separation of powers doctrine. Id. State governmental
power is divided among the same three branches as those found in the federal
government.
38. L. TRIBE, supra note 37, § 3-16; C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS § 14 (4th ed. 1983).
39. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); L. TRIBE, supra note 37, § 3-16; C.
WRIGHT, supra note 38, § 14.
40. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 38, § 14; Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political
Question", 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1031 (1985).
41. Redish, supra note 40, at 1032-33.
42. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
43. Id. at 217. See Davis v. Bandemer, 206 S. Ct. 2797 (1986); Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986); L. TRIBE, supra note 37, § 3-
16; C. WRIGHT, supra note 38, § 14.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/8
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sion-making, or that would lead to unnecessary and undesirable
conflict with another branch.' Since Baker, few courts have invoked
the political question doctrine as a bar to jurisdiction.45 Nevertheless,
the political question doctrine is often an issue in homeless cases.
After a court determines that it has jurisdiction to review a govern-
ment official's discretionary conduct, the usual standard of review is
whether the conduct constitutes an abuse of discretion. A court might
identify an abuse of discretion in a variety of ways. Conduct may be an
abuse of discretion if it is arbitrary, capricious, or undertaken for un-
tenable reasons;46 based on a misconception of law;47 illegal or uncon-
stitutional;4" outside the authority or beyond the power of the
government official;49 or fraudulent, corrupt, oppressive, or grossly
unjust. 50
A legitimate difference of opinion over statutory interpretation does
not render a duty discretionary and, therefore, unenforceable. Clearly
it is within the courts' realm "to say what the law is,"51 and while
44. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; L. TRIBE, supra note 37, § 3-16; C. WRIGHT, supra note
38, § 14.
45. C. WRIGHT, supra note 38, § 14. See Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d at 536-37, 463
N.E.2d at 593-94, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 252-53 (justiciability and political question do not
bar action to enforce individual statutory rights).
46. See, e.g., Houseknecht, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 291, 445 N.E.2d at 407; Clear Lake
City Water Auth. v. Winograd, 695 S.W.2d 632, 642 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Rocke v.
County of Cook, 60 Ill. App. 3d 384, 377 N.E.2d 287 (1978); see also Southern Illinois
Asphalt v. Pollution Control Bd., 60 Ill. 2d 204, 326 N.E.2d 406 (1975); Dorfman v.
Gerber, 29 Ill. 2d 191, 193 N.E.2d 770 (1963); Shadid v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage
Control Bd., 639 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Okla. 1982); Wales v. Tax Comm'n, 100 Ariz. 181,
412 P.2d 472 (1966); Town of Paradice v. Gulf Leisure Corp., 27 Ariz. App. 600, 557
P.2d 532 (1976).
47. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. Commw. 73, 79, 480
A.2d 1330, 1333 (1984).
48. See, e.g., Clear Lake City Water Auth., 695 S.W.2d at 642; Starrett v. Gibson,
168 S.W. 16, 18 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (no writ); Texas Dep't of Mental Health &
Mental Retardation v. Wade, 651 S.W.2d 927, 929 (rex. Ct. App. 1983); Godley v.
Duval County, 361 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (no writ); Marion County v.
Perkins Bros. Co., 171 S.W. 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (no writ); McDowell v. Trustees
of Internal Improvement Fund, 90 So. 2d 715, 718 (Fla. 1956).
49. See, e.g., Chapman v. Watson, 40 Ill. 2d 408, 240 N.E.2d 604 (1968); Rivera v.
City of Douglas, 132 Ariz. 117, 644 P.2d 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Foster v. Thunder-
bird Irrigation Water Dist., 125 Ariz. 3241, 609 P.2d 594 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
50. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Niles Township High School Dist. No. 219 v. Board
of Educ. of Northfield Township High School Dist. No. 225, 112 Ill. App. 3d 212, 218,
445 N.E.2d 464, 470 (1983); Lap v. Thibault, 348 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1977).
51. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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courts give deference to executive or legislative interpretations, they
often order compliance with a statutory duty as they see it.52 If a court
finds that a general statute mandating aid for the poor requires the
provision of shelter, it could order a government to provide shelter de-
spite the government's conflicting interpretation of the statute.
Government officials naturally resist, and the courts are inclined to
limit, judicial intrusions into budgetary matters. When an official fails
to perform a mandatory duty, however, it is no defense that an order of
compliance would require an expenditure of money or that the govern-
ment lacks the funds to comply fully with the duty.5 3 In addition, the
mere fact that legislative conduct involves an appropriation of funds
does not insulate it from judicial review. 4 These principles are impor-
tant in homeless cases because the provision of shelter and other serv-
ices obviously costs money.
2. Judicial Relief Involving Discretionary Choices
When the necessary elements are present for an injunction or writ of
mandamus, courts generally limit the extent of the remedy to meet the
proven violation. If government defendants fail to provide particular
services, a court may order the government to provide those services.
The government is then left to determine how to raise the money neces-
sary to comply with the order.55 When the conduct requiring correc-
tion involves a two-dimensional choice such as the grant or denial of a
specific benefit, the court can simply order reversal of the improper
action. 6 When compliance with a statutory duty involves multidimen-
52. E.g., Kiddy v. Oklahoma City, 576 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1978) (city required to pro-
vide interpreter for deaf persons upon arrest); O'Fallon Dev. Co. v. City of O'Fallon, 71
Ill. App. 3d 220, 389 N.E.2d 677 (1979) (city required to remove private advertisement
from public water tower).
53. See Pingree v. Quaintance, 394 So. 2d 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Klos-
termann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 594, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 253 (1984);
Kiddy v. Oklahoma City, 576 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1978).
54. See Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981).
55. See, e.g., Inverness Forest Improvement Dist. v. Hardy St. Investors, 541
S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Kiddy v. Oklahoma City, 576 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1978).
When plaintiffs seek orders directing particular methods or levels of funding, however,
courts often will not provide relief. Id.; Weber v. City of Sachse, 591 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979).
56. See, e.g., Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 559 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (issuance of a license improperly denied); O'Fallon Dev. Co. v. City of O'Fallon,
71 111. App. 3d 220, 389 N.E.2d 677 (1979) (removal of a private advertisement from
public property); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 34 N.C. App. 619, 240 S.E.2d 460
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sional decision-making, however, a court must decide whether and to
what extent it may intrude into the discretionary area originally en-
trusted to a legislative or executive body.57 In many instances home-
less plaintiffs desire relief more detailed than a simple directive such as
"provide shelter."
A court has the power to impose a remedy after it determines that a
public official is not complying with a complex statutory duty. Non-
compliance may consist of either a total failure to perform or an abuse
of discretion. In determining what remedy to impose, courts apply
general equitable principles.5 As the Supreme Court stated in Brown
v. Board of Education,59 "[t]raditionally, equity has been characterized
by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for
adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." 6
Over the past three decades federal courts frequently resorted to
remedies that intrude deeply into executive and legislative matters.61
The Supreme Court has recognized the broad remedial powers of the
judiciary in these cases: "Once a right and a violation have been
shown, the scope of a district court's equity powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies."6 2
State courts, like federal courts, have relied on their remedial power
to bring government defendants into compliance with legal duties.
63
(1977) (approval of a corporate reorganization plan improperly rejected); Unionville-
Chadds Ford School Dist. v. Rotteveel, 87 Pa. Commw. 334, 487 A.2d 109 (1985) (pro-
vision of free school transportation improperly withheld).
57. See Coffin, The Frontier of Remedies: A Call for Exploration, 67 CALIF. L. REV.
983 (1979); Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional
Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1980).
58. The bases for a court's equitable remedial powers are its constitutional grant of
judicial power and the traditional powers of equity. Special Project, The Remedial Pro-
cess in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 784, 853-54 (1978).
59. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
60. Id. at 300.
61. These intrusions have taken place primarily in school desegregation cases and
other institutional litigation. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Coffin, supra note 57; Eisenberg & Yeazell,
supra note 57; Special Project, supra note 58.
62. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Edue., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). The
Court has gone so far as to indicate that a district court may order a government to levy
taxes to raise the funds necessary to comply with the law. See Griffin v. County School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
63. E.g., Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 400 N.E.2d 1231 (1980);
Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Lucas, 391 Mich. 359, 216 N.W.2d 910 (1974).
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For example, in Perez v. Boston Housing Authority' the court ap-
pointed a receiver to assume the functions of the housing authority
board after a number of remedial steps proved insufficient to bring de-
fendants into compliance with the state sanitary code.65 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the appointment of a re-
ceiver.66  The court rejected defendants' separation of powers argu-
ment, noting that it is a basic function of the judicial branch to remedy
violations of laws, including those committed by the executive
branch. 67 The court also relied on remedial examples provided by the
federal courts in institutional litigation as authority for a court's power
to grant intrusive remedies against public officials. 68 Though the court
in Perez ultimately granted broad relief, it recognized the judicial reluc-
tance to issue mandatory injunctions against government defendants
and the principle that such relief should be no more intrusive than nec-
essary.69 The court nonetheless upheld the imposition of deeply intru-
sive relief, which confined and ultimately eliminated the discretion
originally vested in the defendants, because defendants persisted in
their unlawful conduct despite the court's previous attempts to achieve
compliance.70
64. 379 Mass. 703, 400 N.E.2d 1231 (1980).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 705, 400 N.E.2d at 1234. Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld
a detailed injunction and the appointment of a monitor to remedy the conditions at a
jail in Wayne County, 391 Mich. at 365-66, 216 N.W.2d at 912-13.
67. 379 Mass. at 739, 400 N.E.2d at 1252. The court stated: "To the contrary,
when the executive persists in indifference to, or neglect or disobedience of court orders,
necessitating a receivership, it is the executive that could more properly be charged with
continuing the separation principles." Id. at 739-40, 400 N.E.2d at 1252. See also
Wayne County, 391 Mich. at 365, 216 N.W.2d at 912.
68. 379 Mass. at 729-30, 400 N.E.2d at 1247.
69. Id. at 729-30, 400 N.E.2d at 1247. See also Special Project, supra note 58, at
864.
70. Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 733-34, 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1249
(1980). "[A]s injunctions meet with indifference or violation on the part of the defend-
ant officials, there is justification for the more detailed directions further confining or
eliminating discretion .... The rule of thumb may be that the more indurated the
violations of law and the remedial injunction, the more imperative and controlling the
later superseding injunction." Id.
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IL STATE COURT ENFORCEMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL DUTIES TO
THE POOR
A. Source and Scope of Rights and Duties
There is no common law duty to support the poor, but states have
undertaken a duty to care for their poor inhabitants. States have done
so by either adopting constitutional provisions or enacting statutes.
The New York Constitution provides an example: "The aid, care and
support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the
state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such
means, as the legislature may from time to time determine."'" The
plain language of this section imposes an affirmative duty upon the
state to care for its needy. Recognizing this duty, the New York Court
of Appeals stated that "assistance to the needy is not a matter of legis-
lative grace; rather, it is specifically mandated by our Constitution."72
The most common source of a duty to relieve the poor is found in
state statutes. Though the specific terms of the statutes vary considera-
bly, common themes recur. The statutes typically begin by identifying
the government entity or official that is responsible for providing relief.
The duty is usually imposed on cities or counties,73 townships, 74 mu-
nicipalities, 75 or special welfare districts.76 The administration of the
71. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. Homeless plaintiffs in New Jersey have argued
that the New Jersey Constitution establishes a right to emergency shelter. That para-
graph provides: "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain
natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and ob-
taining safety and happiness." N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1. The court in Maticka v.
Atlantic City, No. L-8306-84E (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1985), declined to rule on plain-
tiffs' constitutional claim because it found a right to shelter in the state statute. See also
MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3): "The legislature shall provide such economic assist-
ance and social and rehabilitative services as may be necessary for those inhabitants
who, by reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune, have need for the aid of society."
72. Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 730
(1977); see also Lee v. Smith, 43 N.Y.2d 453, 373 N.E.2d 247,402 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1977).
According to the Tucker court, the constitutional provision is intended to serve two
functions: to prevent constitutional attack on the state's social welfare programs, and to
provide a clear statement of the positive duty imposed on the state to care for the needy.
43 N.Y.2d at 7, 371 N.E.2d at 451, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
73. See, e.g., CAL, WELF. & INST. CODE § 17,000 (Deering 1985); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 205.580 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.02 (Baldwin 1964).
74. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 12-2-1-6 (1976).
75. See, e.g., N.J. STAT, ANN. § 44:8-120 (West Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. § 49.02(l)
(1971).
76. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 62 (McKinney 1983).
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relief programs may be vested in a board of supervisors,7" a director of
welfare,78 an overseer of the poor,79 or social services officials.8"
When state legislatures have created a statutory duty to relieve the
poor, they frequently use the word "shall" to clarify the mandatory
nature of the duty.81 The actual terms of the duty vary from statute to
statute. The statutes typically begin with vague, general language such
as the duty to "maintain," "support," "provide," "care for," or "re-
lieve."82 Some statutes do no more than set forth those broad terms83
while others explicitly state what services and necessities of life the
government must provide.8
4
The statutes often limit the duty to support the poor. Most fre-
quently these limitations include residency requirements,85 availability
of funds,8 6 and the absence of any person (such as a relative) able or
77. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17,001 (Deering 1985).
78. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8-120 (West Supp. 1986).
79. See, eg., IND. CODE § 12-2-1-6 (1976).
80. N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 131.1 (McKinney 1983).
81. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
82. Id.
83. For example, Mo. REv. STAT. § 205.580 (1978) states: "Poor persons shall be
relieved, maintained and supported by the county of which they are inhabitants."
84. For example, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8-122 (West Supp. 1986) provides:
The director of welfare, by a written order, shall render such aid and material
assistance as he may in his discretion, after reasonable inquiry, deem necessary to
the end that such person may not suffer unnecessarily, from cold, hunger, sickness,
or be deprived of shelter pending further consideration of the case.
Id.
Providing even greater specificity, Wis. STAT. § 49.01(1) (1971) states:
"Relief" means such services, commodities or money as are reasonable and neces-
sary under the circumstances to provide food, housing, clothing, fuel, light, water,
medicine, medical, dental, and surgical treatment (including hospital care), opto-
metrical services, nursing, transportation, and funeral expenses, and include wages
for work relief. The food furnished shall be of a kind and quantity sufficient to
provide a nourishing diet. The housing provided shall be adequate for health and
decency. Where there are children of school age the relief furnished shall include
necessities for which no other provision is made by law. The relief furnished,
whether by money or otherwise, shall be at such times and in such amounts, as will
in the discretion of the relief official or agency meet the needs of the recipient and
protect the public.
Id. See also IND. CODE § 12-2-1-6 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.02(4) (West 1982
& Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.01 (Baldwin 1964).
85. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17,000 (Deering 1985); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 205.600 (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.03 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 5113.05 (Baldwin 1964).
86. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17,000 (Deering 1985).
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statutorily required to care for the poor person.87
B. Enforcement of General Governmental Duties to the Poor
Litigation brought by poor persons to enforce rights established by
state law can be divided into two categories: challenges to a complete
denial of benefits and challenges to the nature or amount of benefits. In
denial-of-benefits cases plaintiffs generally seek judicial review of a gov-
ernment's grounds for denial. Defendant officials may argue that de-
termination of eligibility is left to their discretion and is not subject to
judicial review. A court that reviews a denial of benefits and finds that
defendants acted improperly, however, should have no difficulty choos-
ing and implementing an appropriate remedy, because the grant or de-
nial of benefits is a two-dimensional choice.
The level-of-benefits cases are quite different. In these cases a court
must first decide whether it can review the official's determination of
the nature and amount of benefits. If the court undertakes review and
finds a violation of duty, a wide range of potential remedies becomes
available. Remedial orders in these cases range from an order requir-
ing defendants to make a new determination of benefits to a court-im-
posed determination of the same benefits.
1. Judicial Review in Denial-of-Benefits Cases
Through the exercise of their discretionary power in implementing
welfare programs, local government entities occasionally declare vari-
ous categories of poor people ineligible for public assistance, despite a
general statutory duty to aid all of those in need. In many instances,
however, courts have reversed eligibility limitations. 8 Even though
87. Id.; see also N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131.1 (McKinney 1983) and Mo. Rv.
STAT. § 205.590 (1978) (arguably not a limitation-see infra note 131).
88. See Bernhardt v. Alameda County Bd. of Supervisors, 58 Cal. App. 3d 806, 130
Cal. Rptr. 189 (1976); Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr.
279 (1971); see also Tucker v. Toia, 43 NY.2d 2, 371 N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728
(1977); Page v. City of Auburn, 440 A.2d 363 (Me. 1982); State ex rel. Arteaga v.
Silverman, 56 Wis. 2d 110, 201 N.W.2d 538 (1972); State ex reL Sell v. Milwaukee
County, 65 Wis. 2d 219, 222 N.W.2d 592 (1974); State ex rel. Tiner v. Milwaukee
County, 81 Wis. 2d 77, 250 N.W.2d 393 (1977).
Litigation involving the Wisconsin poor relief statute, WIs. STAT. § 49.01-.61 (1971),
provides a good example of the limits of official discretion to determine eligibility for
benefits. The general relief provision states: "Every municipality shall furnish relief to
all eligible dependent persons therein and shall establish or designate an official or
agency to administer the same .. " Wis. STAT. § 49.02(1) (1971). This statute's lan-
guage makes it clear that the duty it imposes is affirmative and mandatory. Wisconsin
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the constitutional and legislative provisions that mandate support for
the poor grant broad discretion to government officials, that discretion
is limited and may be reviewed by the courts.8 9 Courts state a general
rule that legislation establishing rights and duties relating to the poor
must be liberally construed to achieve its remedial purpose.90 Accord-
ingly, counties and municipalities responsible for implementing welfare
programs cannot exclude, for theoretical reasons, any particular class
of individuals.91 Instead, they must base their decisions on the needs of
individual applicants without regard to potential income sources that
courts apparently agree. The Wisconsin courts recognized both in 1879 and 1977 that
the primary liability and duty to support the poor is on the county (now, municipality).
Wisconsin counties (municipalities) do not furnish relief as a matter of right, but they
have a clear duty to do so by virtue of the statute and its predecessors. Mappes v. Iowa
County, 47 Wis. 31, 1 N.W. 359 (1879); State ax rel. Tiner v. Milwaukee County, 81
Wis. 2d 277, 260 N.W.2d 393 (1977). Ashland County v. Bayfield County, 246 Wis.
315, 318, 16 N.W.2d 809, 810 (1944); State ex rel. Tiner v. Milwaukee County, 65 Wis.
2d 219, 222 N.W.2d 592, 594 (1974). The coverage of the statute is very broad. The
term "dependent person" refers to "a person without the present available money or
income or property or credit, or other means by which the same can be presently ob-
tained, sufficient to provide the necessary commodities and services specified in [the
subsection defining relief] .... " Wis. STAT. § 49.01(2) (1971).
89. See Bernhardt, 58 Cal. App. 3d at 811, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 192; Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d
at 678-79, 483 P.2d at 1237, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 285-87; Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 8-9,
371 N.E.2d 449, 452, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (1977); State ex reL Arteaga v. Silverman,
56 Wis. 2d 110, 201 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1972).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that when a municipality fails to perform its
statutory obligation to provide benefits to the poor, a writ of mandamus is the proper
remedy to compel performance. Arteaga, 56 Wis. 2d at 115-17, 201 N.W.2d at 541;
State ex rel Sell v. Milwaukee County, 65 Wis. 2d 219, 222 N.W.2d 592, 594 (1974).
An attorney general opinion states that the duty is specifically extended to city offi-
cials who could be criminally prosecuted for refusing or willfully neglecting to perform
the duty. 17 Op. Att'y. Gen. 147 (1928).
90. See Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 676 n.8, 483 P.2d 1231, 1236 n.8, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 279, 284 n.8 (1971). See also infra note 109 and accompanying text.
91. For example, courts have determined that theoretical employability without an
actual job opportunity, or the fact that an individual lost or quit a job, are not valid
criteria for denying aid to those in need. See Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d
1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971); Page v. City of Auburn, 440 A.2d 363 (Me. 1982); State
ex rel. Arteaga v. Silverman, 56 Wis. 2d 110, 201 N.W.2d 538 (1972). Similarly, courts
have held that young adults (those between the ages of 18 and 21) cannot be subjected
to more rigorous eligibility standards than others applying for economic relief when
those standards effectively exclude needy persons. See Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 371
N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1977); Bernhardt v. Alameda County Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 58 Cal. App. 3d 806, 130 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1976); see also State ex reL Sell v. Mil-
waukee County, 65 Wis. 2d 219, 222 N.W.2d 572 (1974); State ex rel. Tiner v.
Milwaukee County, 81 Wis. 2d 77, 250 N.W.2d 393 (1977).
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may not exist.9 2
92. In Arteaga, 56 Wis. 2d at 112-13, 201 N.W.2d at 539, the petitioner sought to
compel welfare officials of Milwaukee County to provide him with general relief. The
officials had denied relief on the ground that the petitioner had willingly terminated his
employment. Id. at 113, 201 N.W.2d at 541. The court relied on the statutory defini-
tion of "dependent person," which refers to "present available money . . . or other
means by which the same can be presently obtained.. . ." Id. (emphasis in original).
The court stated that the determination of whether an applicant for relief is a "depen-
dent person" is a question of fact that is not left to the discretion of the welfare officials.
Id. In making this factual determination, welfare officials had no authority to rely on
the applicant's past conduct. Instead, "[i]t is petitioner's present condition of being
unable to provide for himself the necessities of life that classifies him as a 'dependent
person' and entitles him to relief." 56 Wis. 2d at 115-17, 201 N.W.2d at 541. The court
held that the single voluntary termination of employment by the petitioner was an insuf-
ficient ground to deny him general relief, and remanded the case ordering the lower
court to issue the writ of mandamus. Id. at 117-18, 201 N.W.2d at 542. In reaching its
result, the court relied, in part, on Wis. STAT. § 49.02 (1971). This section states that
relief payments can be discontinued for failure to accept a bona fide offer of employment
or inadequate job performance once hired. The Arteaga court construed this section to
apply as "a condition for continued eligibility for general relief, not a bar to initial
eligibility." 56 Wis. 2d at 117-18, 201 N.W.2d at 542. The court read the section to
indicate that relief would be discontinued if a pattern of voluntary terminations devel-
oped. Arteaga, therefore, held that a single, voluntary termination did not establish the
requisite pattern. Id. In 1974 the Wisconsin Supreme Court reaffirmed that a pattern
of voluntary terminations may be sufficient reason for the relief agency to refuse relief.
State ex rel. Sell v. Milwaukee County, 65 Wis. 2d 219, 222 N.W.2d 592 (1974). Fur-
thermore, one court has declared that an administrative rule, under which applicants
who had lost two jobs within the past twelve months were deemed unwilling to work,
violated due process by creating an impermissible, irrebuttable presumption that the
applicants were presently unwilling to work. Garcia v. Silverman, 393 F. Supp. 590
(E.D. Wis. 1975). Section 49.02 was revised, however, in 1983 to include language
that both recipients and applicants must comply with the work-seeking rules of the
agency. As of this writing, no cases have interpreted the new language. Its impact on
Arteaga and the other decision is, therefore, uncertain.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court followed Arteaga in at least two cases by invalidating
other eligibility requirements that went beyond those set forth in the statute. State ex
rel. Sell v. Milwaukee County involved an administrative rule that required applicants to
sell or surrender the title to their motor vehicles. 65 Wis. 2d at 221, 222 N.W.2d at 593.
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus compelling the county to provide relief pursuant
to statutory mandate. Relying on the general language of the statute, the court con-
cluded that the "surrender rule" established "an unauthorized and illegal prerequisite to
the exercise by welfare authorities of their statutory duty to determine whether or not a
person seeking temporary assistance is, in fact, a dependent person and eligible for re-
lief." Id. at 223-24, 222 N.W.2d at 594. The court reiterated that the issue of whether
or not an applicant was a "dependent person" was a question of fact not left to the
discretion of the welfare officials. Id. at 224, 222 N.W.2d at 595. The court further
noted that though the amount and type of assistance was within the officials' discretion,
the only test for determining an applicant's entitlement to relief is whether his need is
greater than his "presently available" assets. If the need exceeds the assets, the govern-
ment must provide relief. Id. The court recognized that the statute does not require
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2. Judicial Review and Remedies in Level-of-Benefits Cases
When plaintiffs challenge the nature or amount of government wel-
fare benefits, courts are less likely to intervene. 93 In level-of-benefits
applicants to have no assets, and that welfare officials may consider available, salable
assets in determining the amount of aid necessary. The ownership of assets, however,
cannot serve as an automatic bar to assistance. Assistance is barred only when the
value of the assets exceeds the "level of need." Id. The court held that the administra-
tive rule was invalid because it imposed requirements beyond those found in the statute,
and remanded the case so that "the lower court can issue a writ of mandamus compel-
ling [the county] to determine plaintiffs' dependency in fact [under the statute], and to
furnish relief to plaintiffs if they so qualify." Id. at 228, 222 N.W.2d at 597. The dissent
objected to invalidating the rule in part on the ground that funds intended to provide
the necessities of life would instead be used to run plaintiff's vehicle. As the dissenting
judge eloquently noted:
Money paid by the public to put cornflakes on the table and milk in the stomachs
of the children will be spent to put gasoline in the tank and rubber on the
wheels.... The wife and children may enjoy the ride with papa in the car that the
majority holds he, as an applicant for temporary assistance, is entitled to continue
to drive, but they will predictably return to a colder house and an emptier table for
it is only from relief allowances made for essentials such as fuel, food and shelter
that the money to keep the car going can come.
Id. at 234, 222 N.W.2d at 600 (Hansen, J., dissenting).
In 1977 the Wisconsin Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that it would invalidate any
preconditions to relief outside those in the statutory scheme. State ex rel. Tiner v. Mil-
waukee County, 81 Wis. 2d 277, 260 N.W.2d 393 (1977). In Tiner, the court consid-
ered the interplay between the general relief and the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) statutes. Petitioner, representing herself and all other AFDC recipi-
ents, challenged Milwaukee County's blanket refusal to grant general relief to any appli-
cant who was receiving AFDC benefits. The class sought mandamus compelling
emergency relief payments to pay for heating fuel for their homes. Petitioners also
sought "a declaratory judgment that the county's absolute policy of refusing to grant
general relief to AFDC recipients for fuel violates the county statutory duty to furnish
relief to all eligible dependent persons within the county." Id. at 291 n.9, 260 N.W.2d
at 394 n.9. The court noted that the AFDC program contains no allowance for emer-
gency fuel relief, and more importantly, that the general relief provisions do not pro-
hibit the granting of general relief to AFDC recipients. Id. at 291, 260 N.W.2d at 395.
Instead, Tiner presented yet another attempt by Milwaukee County welfare officials to
impose nonstatutory restrictions on general relief. Again, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court invalidated the additional restriction.
Milwaukee County argued that AFDC benefits fit within the language "other means"
as found in § 49.01(4) (now § 49.01(2)), and furthermore, that AFDC benefits are suffi-
cient. 81 Wis. 2d at 283-86, 260 N.W.2d at 396-97. The court, however, stated: "the
mere labeling of AFDC payments by the county as 'sufficient' does not necessarily make
them so .. " Id. at 289, 260 N.W.2d at 399. In examining the AFDC statutory
scheme more closely, the Tiner court also noted that the legislature's failure to declare
AFDC recipients ineligible for general relief indicates its intention not to limit appli-
cants' access to general relief. Id. at 291 n.8, 260 N.W.2d at 399 n.8.
93. See Bernstein v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 437, 449, 373 N.E.2d 238, 244, 402 N.Y.S.2d
342, 349 (1977) ("We explicitly recognized in Tucker that the Legislature is vested with
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cases courts may have to decide whether determining the amount or
kind of services the government must provide is a justiciable issue. In
these cases the challenged governmental action clearly involves the ex-
ercise of discretion, and the responsible officials may argue that the
separation of powers or political question doctrine bars judicial
intervention.
94
For example, when plaintiffs in Massachusetts and New York
sought an increase in welfare benefits, state officials argued that the
courts were constitutionally prohibited from reviewing the sufficiency
of benefits.95 Officials in the Massachusetts case based their argument
on the state separation of powers doctrine. 96 The court rejected that
argument and held that it is the judiciary's function to determine
whether the executive branch is violalting the law, even when the con-
duct in question involves the appropriation of money.97 In the New
York case state officials made a more compelling argument based on a
state constitutional provision that explicitly vests in the legislature the
power to determine the manner and means of state aid to the poor.98
A divided court agreed with the officials that determination of the level
of welfare benefits is a matter committed exclusively to the legisla-
ture.9 9 The results in these cases illustrate the limited use of the polit-
ical question doctrine in cases involving state poor laws. A court may
discretion to determine the amount of aid; what we there held prohibited was the Legis-
lature's 'simply refusing to aid those whom it has classified as needy.' ").
94. See supra notes 37-70 and accompanying text.
95. Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. Dukakis, No. 80109, slip op. at 3
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 26, 1986); RAM v. Blum, 77 A.D.2d 278, 432 N.Y.S.2d 892
(1980).
96. Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless, No. 80109, slip op. at 5-6.
97. Id. at 6.
98. RAM, 77 A.D.2d at 280, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 893-94. See supra text accompanying
note 71 for the constitutional provision relied on by defendants.
99. 77 A.D.2d at 278-84, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 893-96. Five judges of the appellate court
wrote four separate opinions in RAM. Two judges believed the courts are "constitution-
ally excluded" from intervening in the area of the amount of public assistance. Id. at
278-79, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (Ross & Yesawich, JJ.). One concurring judge agreed that
the constitution conferred discretion on the legislature without establishing any stan-
dard that a court could review, but that judge would not hold that judicial intervention
would never be required. Id. at 280-81, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 893-94 (Fein J., concurring).
The second concurring judge stated that the issue presented was justiciable but that the
legislature had not abused its discretion. Id. at 282-84, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 895-96 (San-
dier, J., concurring). Thus, even when a state constitution expressly vests discretion in
the legislature to determine the manner and means of public assistance, the question of
whether a court has the power to review that determination is unsettled.
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decline to intervene when a state constitution expressly commits a mat-
ter to another branch of government. Even with such a constitutional
commitment, the justiciability question is not clearly settled."°°
Courts reviewing the level or nature of governmental welfare benefits
will order a modification of benefits only if the government's conduct
violates a clear statutory mandate. In the Massachusetts case dis-
cussed above the court held that state officials violated a statutory pro-
vision requiring that aid furnished under the AFDC program be
sufficient to enable parents to raise children properly in their own
homes.11 Although the court acknowledged that it had neither the
duty nor the expertise to say what amount would be sufficient, it held
as a matter of law that the level set by defendants was inadequate. 102
Courts in other states have invalidated welfare benefit systems when
the governing statutes require individual consideration of need1" 3 or,
like the Massachusetts statute, set a substantive sufficiency standard."14
When statutes neither require individualized determinations nor set
minimum substantive standards, however, courts have refused to inter-
fere with challenged assistance programs. 105
Courts reviewing the level or type of benefits provided under state
poor laws apply the same standards that courts generally apply in re-
100. See supra note 99. See also Note, A Right to Shelter for the Homeless in New
York State, 61 N.Y.U.L. REv. 272 (1986), arguing that the court was wrong in conclud-
ing that the issue was nonjusticiable. Id. at 297.
101. Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. Dukakis, No. 80109 (Mass.
Super. Ct. June 26, 1986).
102. Id., slip op. at 13.
103. A Nevada court ordered an increase in the amount of aid for blind persons
when the statute requires assistance at a level that adequately meets their "actual need."
Villa v. Arrizabalaga, 466 P.2d 663 (Nev. 1970). Similarly, a court in New Hampshire
held that a flat grant system (an aid program in which benefits are distributed on a
uniform basis rather than in individual basis) was inconsistent with a statute that re-
quires the responsible officials to consider the circumstances in each case. Clark v. New
Hampshire Dep't of Health & Welfare, 315 A.2d 187 (N.H. 1974).
104. An Ohio statute provides that those in need are entitled to relief "sufficient to
maintain health and decency." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5110.03 (Baldwin 1964). The
Ohio Supreme Court held that grant levels set by the state government were too low to
comply with that requirement. State ex rel. Ventrome v. Birkel, 54 Ohio St. 2d 461, 377
N.E.2d 780 (1978).
105. The New York Court of Appeals and the Hawaii Supreme Court upheld flat
grant systems when the relevant state statutes did not contain language requiring indi-
vidualized grants. See Bernstein v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 437, 373 N.E.2d 238, 402 N.Y.S.2d
342 (1977); Keller v. Thompson, 532 P.2d 664 (Haw. 1975). Additionally, the Hawaii
statute states that benefits shall not exceed a level necessary to maintain health and
decency, but does not require that benefit meet that standard. HAw. REV. STAT. § 346-
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viewing other discretionary conduct of government officials.1"6 Courts
will uphold the official conduct unless they find that it is inconsistent or
in conflict with the statute, 10 7 or that it is unreasonable or arbitrary
and capricious.'0 8 When interpreting state poor laws, however, courts
incline toward a liberal construction of the statutes so that remedial
statutory purposes may be achieved." 9
Remedies granted in cases in which courts found the level of benefits
to violate state poor law requirements exemplify judicial reluctance to
make discretionary decisions that are committed to other government
officials."' Some courts merely declared that the established levels
conflict with the statutory mandate' 1 ' or held that the levels of benefits
must meet the statutory standard." 2 Other courts have gone a small
step farther and explicitly ordered government officials to set new
levels of benefits in accordance with the statutory requirements.' '1 In
none of the cases, however, has the court issued specific directions to
the responsible government officials telling them how to restructure
programs or at what level to set future benefits. As in other areas of
law, these drastic measures are necessary and appropriate only if the
court concludes that defendants would fail to conform to less intrusive
remedial orders.
73 (1968). This statute is different from OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5110.03, which re-
quires the distribution of aid necessary to maintain health and decency.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that county officials properly exercised their
discretion by providing services in kind (food and housing), rather than the cash relief
sought by petitioner. State ex rel. Nelson v. Rock County, 271 Wis. 312, 73 N.W.2d
564 (1955).
106. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Clark, 315 A.2d at 190; Bernstein, 43 N.Y.2d at 448, 373 N.E.2d at
245, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
108. See, e.g., Keller, 532 P.2d at 671-62; Arrizabalaga, 466 P.2d at 665; Bernstein,
43 N.Y.2d at 448, 373 N.E.2d at 245, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
109. See Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless, No. 80109, slip op. at 7 (quoting
SUTHERLAND & SAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 71.08 (4th ed. 1972)).
110. See supra notes 55-70 and infra notes 207-10 and accompanying texts for gen-
eral discussion of remedial choices in lawsuits that challenge the conduct of government
officials.
11. See, e.g., Clark, 315 A.2d at 190-91.
112. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ventrome v. Birkel, 54 Ohio St. 2d 461, 377 N.E.2d 780
(1978).
113. See, e.g., Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless, No. 80109, slip op. at 14-
15; Arrizabalaga, 466 P.2d at 665-66.
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III. STATE COURT RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENTAL DUTIES TO THE HOMELESS
In litigation against government entities and officials to secure shel-
ter and other relief for homeless people, courts generally face three
contested issues.114 Do homeless plaintiffs have a legal right to shelter
and other services, and does a government have a corresponding duty
to these plaintiffs? Can the court review the conduct of responsible
government officials to determine whether they have acted or failed to
act in a manner that violates a plaintiff's right? Finally, what remedies
can the court impose to provide relief for homeless plaintiffs without
improperly intruding into matters committed to the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches of government? Each of these issues will be discussed
below.
A. Finding a Right to Shelter and Other Services in Governmental
Duties to the Poor
Courts have found, in state constitutional and statutory provisions
like those described in Part II above, governmental duties to provide
shelter and other services for homeless people." 5 In a seminal case
involving the rights of the homeless, Callahan v. Carey, a New York
court in 1979 found "that the Bowery derelicts are entitled to board
and lodging," and that state and city officials had a duty to furnish
these services.' 6 The court found these rights and duties to exist in
the general provisions of the state constitution'1 7 and the state poor
114. Courts dealing with the claims of homeless people have had no difficulty find-
ing that without shelter plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm. In Callahan v. Carey,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979), the court cited
undisputed evidence that homeless men without shelter would freeze to death from ex-
posure and would starve to death without food. The courts also have concluded, with
minimal discussion, that irreparable harm to homeless plaintiffs outweighs the hardship
to the defendants in providing shelter.
In Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983), the threat of irreparable harm
was a statutory and regulatory prerequisite to the provision of adult protective services.
The court, however, did not have to deal with the issue of irreparable harm because
imminent harm is a qualifying factor for relief under the statute.
115. The Federal Constitution contains no right to shelter or minimally adequate
housing. Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); Williams v. Barry, 490 F. Supp.
941, 944 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
116. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979).
117. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. See supra text accompanying note 71 for full text.
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laws."" The constitutional provision mandates that the state provide
"aid, care and support" for the needy.119 The statutes impose on public
welfare districts the responsibility "for the assistance and care" of any
person in need, 120 and impose on social services officials the duty "to
provide adequately for those unable to maintain themselves," and to
"administer such care, treatment and service as may restore such per-
sons to a condition of self support or self care."'
12 1
A New Jersey court found under that state's poor laws that "home-
less and needy persons... have a right to safe and suitable emergency
shelter and other immediate assistance such as food and clothing."
' 122
The court in Maticka v. Atlantic City 123 relied on a statutory provision
requiring that "[i]mmediate public assistance shall be rendered
promptly to any needy person by the director of welfare of the munici-
118. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 62(1), 131(1), (3) (McKinney 1983).
119. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
120. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 62(1) provides in full: "Subject to reimbursement in
the cases hereinafter provided for each public welfare district shall be responsible for the
assistance and carre of any person who resides or is found in its territory and who is in
need of public assistance and care which he is unable to provide for himself."
121. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131(1), (3) provide:
I. It shall be the duty of social services officials, insofar as funds are available for
that purpose, to provide adequately for those unable to maintain themselves, in
accordance with the requirements of this article and other provisions of this chap-
ter. They shall, whenever possible, administer such care, treatment and service as
may restore such persons to a condition of self-support or self-care, and shall fur-
ther give such service to those liable to become destitute as may prevent the neces-
sity of their becoming public charges.
3. As far as possible families shall be kept together, they shall not be separated for
reasons of poverty alone, and they shall be provided services to maintain and
strengthen family life. In providing such services, the public welfare official may
utilize appropriate community resources, including nonprofit private agencies.
Whenever practicable, assistance and service shall be given a needy person in his
own home. The commissioner of public welfare may, however, in his discretion,
provide assistance and care in a boarding home, a home of a relative, a public or
private home or institution, or in a hospital.
In a more recent case involving homeless families with children, a New York appellate
court also found a right to emergency shelter in the state constitutional provision relied
on in Callahan. See McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986). See
also Koster v. Webb, 598 F. Supp. 1134, 1138 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying motion to
dismiss complaint alleging unlawful denial of shelter under New York state law).
122. Maticka v. Atlantic City, No. L-8306-84E (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1985).
123. Id.
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pality.... " 124 In addition, the statute requires that the director render
such aid and assistance as he deems necessary to prevent suffering from
cold, hunger, and lack of shelter.125
In a Missouri case that resulted in a consent decree requiring the
provision of shelter and other services for homeless people, plaintiffs
asserted rights under a state statute that provides: "Poor persons shall
be relieved, maintained and supported by the county of which they are
inhabitants."1
2 6
In addition to statutes creating a general duty to support poor per-
sons, homeless litigation has been brought under statutes that provide
for the assistance of more discrete segments of the population, such as
"incapacitated adults," '127 persons released from mental institutions, 128
needy families with children,129 and persons displaced because of con-
124. General Public Assistance Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8-120 (West Supp.
1986).
125. Id. § 44:8-122. The full text of this selection is set out in note 84, supra.
126. Mo. REv. STAT. § 205.580 (1978). Prior to entry of the negotiated consent
decree the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss, implicitly recognizing the legiti-
macy of plaintiffs' cause of action. Graham v. Schoemehl, No. 854-00035 (Mo. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 4, 1985).
127. The West Virginia Supreme Court, in Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W.
Va. 1983), found a right to shelter, food, and medical care for homeless poor persons
under a state statute designed to provide protective services to incapacitated adults.
The court relied on the Social Services for Adults Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 9-6-1 to 9-6-8
(Supp. 1982), to conclude that the legislature intended the term "incapacitated adult" to
include indigent homeless persons who are unable to provide for themselves the basic
necessities of life. 303 S.E.2d at 249-50. The act defines "incapacitated adult" as "any
person who by reason of physical, mental or other infirmity is unable to independently
carry on the daily activities of life necessary to sustaining life and reasonable health."
W. VA. CODE § 9-6-1(4) (Supp. 1982). The court interpreted the phrase "or other infir-
mity" to include poor persons who are unable to care for themselves. 303 S.E.2d at 249-
50.
128. In New York a narrower class of homeless persons, those released from mental
institutions, asserted their rights to a service plan that would ensure both continued
treatment and adequate housing. Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d
588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984). The plaintiffs in Klostermann relied primarily upon New
York's mental health statutes that entitle discharged or released mental patients to a
written service plan and a program to insure adequate living facilities and receipt of
needed services. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(f)-(h) (McKinney 1978). Though
it did not reach the merits of the case, the court held that plaintiffs asserted justiciable
claims for declaration and enforcement of their statutory rights. 61 N.Y.2d at 535-37,
463 N.E.2d at 593-94, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 252-53. See infra notes 136-41 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of the Klostermann case.
129. A New York appellate court found a duty to provide emergency shelter for
homeless families with children in the state's election to participate in a program for
Emergency Assistance to Needy Families With Children (EAF). McCain v. Koch, 117
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/8
GOVERNMENTAL DUTIES TO THE HOMELESS
demnation of their residences. 130 In some of these cases a critical issue
was the determination of the intended statutory beneficiaries. Courts
have applied a liberal construction to the statutes, as they have in en-
forcing state poor laws in other contexts, and have found the statutes to
cover broad classes of homeless persons.1
3
'
None of the courts rendering decisions in homeless cases had dilfi-
A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986). The McCain case involved only the granting of a
preliminary injunction, so the court's precise holding was that the plaintiffs have a
"high probability" of establishing their right to emergency shelter. The EAF program
is a part of the federally funded program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC). Id. at 204, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 723. As part of the EAF plan the state specified
its election "to provide the service of 'securing family shelter' when necessary to cope
with emergency situations." Id at 212, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 728. See Koster v. Webb, 598
F. Supp. 1134, 1136-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying motion to dismiss complaint alleging
right to emergency shelter under the EAP program). In a recently filed lawsuit, plain-
tiffs challenged the federal government's failure to monitor states that participate in the
EAF program. Plaintiffs sought to require those states to provide emergency shelter.
Cohen v. Bowen, No. 86-2448 (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 1986) (Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief).
130. The Connecticut Supreme Court found that persons rendered homeless by a
city's condemnation of their residences as unsafe and unfit for human habitation were
entitled to the benefits of a city-provided relocation assistance program. Dukes v. Du-
rante, 192 Conn. 207, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984). The court found that the relocation stat-
ute, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-226 to 8-282 (1983), required the city to provide facilities
or services necessary to ensure, prior to displacement, the availability of suitable re-
placement housing. 192 Conn. at 213-14, 219-20, 224,471 A.2d at 1372-73, 1376, 1378.
131. In Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983), the government argued
that petitioners were not "incapacitated adults" entitled to the benefits of the protective
service statute simply because they were homeless poor persons. Id. at 248-49. The
government relied in part upon department of welfare regulations limiting services to
persons suffering from physical or mental infirmities. Id. at 249. The court, however,
broadly interpreted the statute as remedial legislation. Id. at 250. The court concluded
that when the legislature included the phrase "other infirmity" in the definition of "in-
capacitated adult," it intended that the term include poor persons who cannot care for
themselves. Id. at 249-50.
A similar issue was present in Graham v. Schoemehl, No. 854-00035 (Mo. Cir. Ct.
1985), in which the city of St. Louis argued that the general duty to relieve the poor
contained in Mo. REV. STAT. § 205.580 (1978) was limited by another provision that
provides: "Aged, infirm, lame, blind or sick persons, who are unable to support them-
selves, and when there are no other persons required by law and able to maintain them,
shall be deemed poor persons." Mo. REV. STAT. § 205.590 (1978). Plaintiffs argued
that all homeless poor persons are infirm, relying in part on Hodge, and also that
§ 205.590 is not intended to provide an exclusive definition of "poor persons." Support
for plaintiff's interpretation that the provision is not a limitation "but rather is a state-
ment of particular classes, among others, to which the statute shall apply," is found in a
Missouri Attorney General opinion. See Op. Att'y Gen. 141 (1968). The court in
Graham did not resolve that dispute, but the consent decree is written broadly to in-
clude the homeless plaintiffs "and all other people in the City of St. Louis who are or
19871
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culty finding the provision of shelter and other necessities of life among
the services included in the government's duty to poor plaintiffs. While
a few of the cases involved statutes that specifically require the securing
or provision of shelter,13 2 other cases dealt with statutes containing
only passing reference to shelter 133 or no reference to shelter at all.' 34
B. Judicial Review of Official Conduct to Determine Whether It
Violates Plaintiff's Rights and Fails to Satisfy Defendant's
Duties
When judicial inquiry turns to assessing the action or inaction of
government officials to determine whether this conduct violates plain-
tiffs' rights, one of two standards must be met before a court may con-
sider granting affirmative relief. A court must find either that the
government is failing to perform a mandatory duty or that its conduct
amounts to an abuse of discretion.13 When dealing with this issue a
court is most likely to face questions concerning the extent of its pow-
ers to review the conduct of coordinate branches of government.
In some homeless cases the government's failure to act is clear. In
Callahan v. Carey, in which the court found that homeless men have a
right to shelter and that the defendant officials had a duty to provide it,
the evidence clearly indicated that the officials were not providing
enough shelter to accommodate all of the homeless men who needed it.
Similarly, in Dukes v. Durante the officials simply were not doing any-
thing to meet their obligation to assure the availability of suitable re-
will become homeless." Graham v. Schoemehl, No. 854-00035 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 15,
1985) (consent decree).
Similarly, defendants in Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984),
contended that the state Relocation Assistance Act does not cover persons displaced by
housing code enforcement but only persons required to move because of building code
enforcement or other city activity. Id. at 212, 471 A.2d at 1372. The court relied on a
reading of the statute as a whole and construed the Act broadly to include all persons
displaced by any kind of code enforcement activity. Id. at 214-21, 471 A.2d at 1373-76.
132. See, e.g., Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984); Klos-
termann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984); McCain
v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986). See supra notes 128-30 for a dis-
cussion of these cases.
133. Maticka v. Atlantic City, No. L-8306-84E (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1985);
Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983). See supra notes 122-25, 127 and
accompanying texts.
134. Callahan v. Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5,
1979); McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986).
135. See supra notes 26-27, 46-50 and accompanying texts.
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placement housing before displacing tenants by condemnation. After
the courts in these cases found a mandatory duty that was intended to
benefit plaintiffs, they had no difficulty determining that defendants
were not complying with the statute. In other cases, however, courts
must carefully analyze the statutory scheme to determine whether
mandatory duties exist and if so, whether defendants are engaging in
conduct that satisfies these duties.
In Klostermann v. Cuomo 136 the statute at issue required that mu-
nicipalities create and implement, for each deinstitutionalized mental
patient, a plan covering both treatment and an appropriate resi-
dence.' 7 Plaintiffs alleged that the responsible officials failed to create
and implement these plans." 8 Defendants argued, and the lower
courts held, that the controversy was nonjusticiable because the statu-
tory duties involve the exercise of discretion, and in particular, ques-
tions of resource allocation.' 3 9 The New York Court of Appeals
reversed, articulating a basis distinction that defendants and the lower
courts failed to make "between a court's imposition of its own policy
determination upon its governmental partners and its mere declaration
and enforcement of the individual's rights that have already been con-
ferred by the other branches of government."'' The court held that
plaintiffs' claims presented the latter situation, and that they were,
therefore, justiciable.141
A mix of discretionary and nondiscretionary activity also existed in
Hodge v. Ginsberg'4 2 and Maticka v. Atlantic City.'4 3 The courts in
both of those cases concluded that the responsible officials were failing
to perform mandatory duties to provide emergency shelter and other
services to homeless plaintiffs.'"
The statute in Hodge provided that the Department of Welfare "may
develop a plan for a comprehensive system of adult protective serv-
136. 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984).
137. Id. at 532 n.1, 463 N.E.2d at 591 n.1, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250 n.1.
138. Id. at 531-32, 463 N.E.2d at 591-92, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250-51.
139. Id. at 533, 463 N.E.2d at 592, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
140. Id. at 535, 463 N.E.2d at 593, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 252. The court also rejected
defendants' resource allocation argument. Id. at 536-37, 463 N.E.2d at 594, 475
N.Y.S.2d at 253.
141. Id. at 537, 463 N.E.2d at 594, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
142. 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983).
143. No. L-8306-84E (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1985).
144. Hodge, 303 S.E.2d at 251, Maticka, No. L-8306-84E, slip op. at 5-6.
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ices," and that any such plan "shall offer such services as are available
and appropriate." '145 Because the department exercised its discretion
and developed a plan under the statute, the court concluded that the
duty to offer available and appropriate services was mandatory and
nondiscretionary. 1" The statute also gave the official discretion to pro-
mulgate implementing regulations to the extent that he "believes feasi-
ble . . . within the state appropriations and other funds available."'147
The court found that the official had exercised his discretion by
promulgating regulations that established a mandatory duty to provide
assistance that "will meet the individual's needs." '148 The court issued
a writ of mandamus based on its conclusion that the official had a
mandatory and enforceable duty "to provide such services as are 'ap-
propriate in the circumstances' and which 'meet the individual's
needs.' "149
The statute in Maticka required the director of welfare to provide
such assistance "as he may in his discretion ... deem necessary" to
prevent unnecessary suffering or deprivation of shelter. 150 The court
found that the city failed to provide shelter and other immediate assist-
ance to some of the homeless plaintiffs, and that substantial numbers of
homeless persons and inadequate shelter facilities existed in Atlantic
City. Based on those findings the court concluded that city officials
were failing to satisfy their statutory duties, and issued a permanent
injunction. 151
The only homeless case in which a court refused to interfere with the
conduct of another branch of government involved New York's ex-
plicit constitutional commitment of discretion to the state legislature.
In McCain v. Koch 152 the court measured the conduct of New York
City and State officials against the state constitutional requirement to
relieve the poor "in such manner and by such means, as the legislature
145. Hodge, 303 S.E.2d at 250 (emphasis added by the court).
146. Id.
147. Id. (emphasis added by the court).
148. Id. at 251.
149. Id.
150. The court relied on N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:9-122 (West Supp. 1986), the text of
which is set out in note 84, supra. Maticka, No. L-8306-84E, slip op. at 5.
151. See generally Maticka, No. L-8306-84E (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1985).
152. 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986).
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may from time to time determine."15 The court found that the city's
policy of providing cash allowances and housing information to home-
less families amounted to a denial of aid and violated the constitutional
duty. 54 When it dealt with the issue of the adequacy of shelter pro-
vided by the city, however, the court held that it was unable to inter-
fere with the city's discretionary conduct as long as its efforts were
more than token.1
55
C. Remedies in Homeless Cases
A variety of remedies have been imposed in litigation seeking shelter
and other services for the homeless. Courts that have provided relief in
homeless cases generally have attempted to minimize intrusion into
governmental affairs.
1. Minimally Intrusive Remedies
Most of the remedial orders entered in homeless rights cases to date
did not intrude deeply into matters committed to the discretion of leg-
islative or executive bodies. Klostermann v. Cuomo' 56 exemplifies this
approach. Plaintiffs in Klostermann sought an order requiring the state
to develop and implement individual plans for the housing and treat-
ment of discharged mental patients.1 57 Reversing the lower courts' dis-
missal of plaintiffs' claims as nonjusticiable, the New York Court of
Appeals held that a judgment in plaintiffs' favor need not involve the
courts in executive and legislative decisionmaking, but may simply be a
declaration and enforcement of rights already conferred by the other
branches.15 ' The court explained that if government officials fail to
perform mandatory, nondiscretionary duties, a court may order them
to fulfill their obligations.1 59 The court was careful, however, to im-
pose a limit on interference with the discretionary choices that the leg-
153. N.Y. CONsT. art. XVII, § 1. See supra text accompanying note 71 for the full
text of this provision.
154. 117 A.D.2d at 216, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
155. Id. at 218-19, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 732-33. See infra notes 178-80 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of this issue in the context of the court's remedial power. See also
Note, supra note 100, arguing that the discretion granted to the legislature is subject to
review by the courts. Id. at 297.
156. 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984).
157. Id. at 533, 463 N.E.2d at 592, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
158. Id. at 536, 463 N.E.2d at 593-94, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 252-53.
159. Id. at 540, 463 N.E.2d at 596, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
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islature reserved to defendants. 160 Thus, on remand, the lower court in
Klostermann could order the state to develop and implement individual
housing and treatment plans but may be unable to not dictate the con-
tent of those plans. 16
1
In cases involving a claimed right to shelter and other necessities of
life under a general statute or constitutional provision requiring aid or
support for the poor, several courts have avoided intrusive remedies by
ordering the responsible public officials merely to provide shelter and
other specified services. In Callahan v. Carey'62 the court issued a
temporary injunction requiring New York City to find lodgings and
provide food for its homeless men. 161 In McCain v. Koch "I the court
granted "a preliminary injunction barring the denial of emergency
shelter to homeless families." 16
5
Some courts have added to these directives a provision that the gov-
ernment accord relief in the manner required by statutes and regula-
tions. The court in Hodge v. Ginsberg,166 for example, directed the
state "to provide emergency shelter, food and medical care to the peti-
tioners and other similarly situated persons as required by" West Vir-
ginia statute and regulations. 167 A dissenting justice in Hodge asserted
that the court's order was deficient because it failed to clearly specify
what emergency services the state must provide, who is to receive the
benefits, and how the state is to obtain the resources to implement the
160. Id. at 541, 463 N.E.2d at 596, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 255. The court stated: "The
activity that the courts must be careful to avoid is the fashioning of orders or judgments
that go beyond any mandatory directives of existing statutes and regulations and in-
trude upon the policy-making and discretionary decisions that are reserved to the legis-
lative branches." Id.
161. The trial court in Klosternann has issued one order on remand, 126 Misc. 2d
247, 481 N.Y.S.2d 580 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), but has not yet reached the merits of this
issue.
162. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1979).
163. The court also directed defendants to submit a plan for lodging and feeding
750 men. Id. A later Callahan order entered a consent decree dealing with space and
facilities requirements at public shelters. See Eldredge v. Koch, 98 A.D.2d 675, 469
N.Y.S.2d 744 (1983) (describing the Callahan consent decree).
164. 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986).
165. Id. at 211, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 727-28.
166. 303 S.E.2d 245 (NV. Va. 1983).
167. Id. at 251. See also Maticka v. Atlantic City, No. L-8306-84E (N.J. Super. Ct.
Feb. 16, 1984), ordering "that defendants immediately take such steps as are necessary
to provide plaintiffs and other homeless men and women with safe and suitable emer-
gency shelter and immediate assistance pursuant to the requirements of the General
Public Assistance Law ... and the General Assistance Manual .. "
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order.16 What the dissent overlooks and the majority does not articu-
late is that these are matters that the legislature originally entrusted to
the discretion of responsible public officials. If the court provided the
directions found lacking by the dissent, it would be intruding deeply
into discretionary areas.
The court took a more intrusive remedial step in Callahan by order-
ing the city both to provide shelter and food and to submit a plan for
the provision of these services to 750 men. 169 This type of order allows
officials an opportunity to exercise their discretion in determining, with
court supervision and guidance, how to comply with their constitu-
tional and statutory duties to the poor.
2. Detailed Remedial Orders
Courts have imposed detailed injunctive relief in some homeless
cases, covering matters that ordinarily would be left to the discretion of
executive and legislative bodies. In some cases courts have imposed
this relief as the result of negotiations between homeless persons and
governments.
Nearly two years after the New York Supreme Court granted a pre-
liminary injunction in Callahan v. Carey,170 it endorsed a consent de-
cree ordering the city to provide food and shelter to every needy
homeless man and to set minimum shelter standards in terms of physi-
cal space and bathroom facilities.
171
A lawsuit on behalf of the homeless poor in St. Louis was resolved
with the entry of a consent decree committing the city to meet both the
short- and some of the long-term needs of the homeless.172 The decree
in Graham v. Schoemeh117' broadly defines the term "homeless" to in-
clude persons without shelter, persons temporarily staying in private
168. Hodge, 303 S.E.2d at 251-52 (Neely, J., dissenting). The dissent paraphrased
the order as follows: "We are against homelessness and we want you, without funds
(since we haven't any spending authority) and without guidance (since we don't want to
take the trouble to think the problem through), to do something (but we won't tell you
what) about it." Id. at 252 (emphasis and quotations marks in original).
169. Callahan v. Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5,
1979).
170. Id.
171. See supra note 163.
172. Graham v. Schoemehl, No. 854-00035 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 15, 1985). See supra
note 126 and accompanying text for a description of the basis for plaintiffs' claims.
173. Id.
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emergency shelters, and persons living in unsafe housing. 74 The de-
cree requires the city to operate a centralized reception center and a
day center for homeless women, children, and families; to provide
transportation; and to make available transitional services such as job
counseling, life skills classes, and housing assistance. 17s The decree fur-
ther mandates a minimum amount of money that the city must spend
during fiscal year 1985-86 to provide these services, and requires the
city to create in 1986 new emergency shelter space for at least 200
people and to provide at least 100 additional permanent housing units
for the homeless. 176
In two homeless shelter cases with detailed court-imposed injunctive
orders, the appellate courts found the relief overly intrusive and conse-
quently required modification.' 77 The trial court in McCain v. Koch 178
imposed minimum standards of decency, health, and safety for family
shelter facilities. 179 The appellate court reluctantly struck down those
standards on the ground that the adequacy of aid to the poor is a mat-





177. Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984); McCain v. Koch,
117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986).
178. 127 Misc. 2d 23, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2984), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, and modified in part, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986).
179. Id. at 24-25, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
180. 117 A.D.2d at 216, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 731. The court interpreted earlier cases to
preclude judicial intrusion into the issue of adequacy of services provided to the poor.
The court held that as long as the city's efforts are more than token, its conduct is
unreviewable:
[W]e are unable to afford the plaintiffs complete and meaningful relief. The inabil-
ity of courts to set even minimum standards for meeting "the legitimate needs of
each recipient" ... upon the failure of the Legislature to do so is discouraging,
saddening, and disheartening. When thousands of children are put at risk in their
physical and mental health, and subject to inevitable emotional scarring, because of
the failure of the City and State officials to provide emergency shelter for them
which meets minimum standards of decency and habitability, it is time for the
Court of Appeals to reexamine and, hopefully, change its prior holdings in this
area. The lives and characters of the young are too precious to be dealt with in a
way justified, as argued, on the ground that the government's efforts are more than
token. They may be more than token, but they are inadequate....
In light of the broad discretion vested in the Legislature, we cannot con-
clude that plaintiffs are likely to prove that Article 17 substantively guarantees
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The Connecticut Supreme Court modified a detailed injunction in
Dukes v. Durante'8' on the grounds that the relief imposed by the trial
court was too drastic and inflexible." 2 Prior to the issuance of the in-
junction the city petitioned the trial court for a hearing in which it
could have input into the scope of relief to be granted."8 3 Without
ruling on that request the trial court issued an injunction requiring the
city to provide the following for each person displaced due to condem-
nation: emergency shelter for two weeks, temporary housing with a
kitchen and adequate space for up to four months, relocation benefits,
school transportation for children, and permanent housing within four
months after displacement.18 4 The court was sympathetic to the city's
argument that only a program of newly constructed housing would en-
able it to satisfy the trial court's order, and thus ordered the lower
court to modify its order to allow the city to comply by continuing
with its plan to rehabilitate existing housing.'
IV. SUGGESTED ANALYSIS OF JUSTICIABILITY AND REMEDIAL
ISSuES IN HOMELESS CASES
A pattern of issues is forming in the increasingly frequent lawsuits
brought by the homeless under state laws creating general governmen-
tal duties to the poor. The most difficult issues tend to revolve around
justiciability and remedies. A comprehensive approach that would or-
ganize these problems and suggest ways of resolving them is needed.
This section represents one attempt to provide such a general
framework.
A. Determination of Which Issues are Justiciable in Homeless Cases
When homeless poor people sue government entities and officials to
enforce state poor law provisions, courts must determine whether the
issues raised by plaintiffs are justiciable. Governments argue that what
they do to aid the poor and how they do it are nonjusticiable political
minimal physical standards of cleanliness, warmth, space, and rudimentary con-
venience in emergency shelter.
Id. at 216-17, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 731. See Note, supra note 100, arguing that the legisla-
tive discretion is reviewable. Id. at 297.
181. 192 Conn. 207, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984).
182. Id. at 225, 471 A.2d at 1378.
183. Id. at 211-12, 471 A.2d at 1372.
184. Id. at 210-11, 471 A.2d at 1371-72.
185. Id. at 225-26, 471 A.2d at 1378.
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questions. This argument is based on the ground that these matters are
exlcusively committed to their discretion or that the issues involve
broad questions of public policy and resource allocation.
186
Among the threshold questions in homeless suits are issues of statu-
tory construction-who are the intended beneficiaries of the law in
question, and what rights do they have. Homeless plaintiffs may seek
only a declaratory judgment, or the determination of their rights may
serve as the predicate for a mandatory injunction or writ of manda-
mus.1 87 In either case, when a controversy exists regarding the exist-
ence, definition, or extent of rights and duties under a constitutional or
statutory provision, the proper interpretation of that provision is an
appropriate question for judicial resolution. 88
Before a court can issue an injunction or writ of mandamus it must
determine whether the rights and duties created by the state poor law
are judicially enforceable. If the court finds that the law gives each
homeless person an enforceable individual right to shelter, and if the
government is failing to provide enough shelter for all who need it, the
government is violating its legal duty and the court can order compli-
ance. Governments may argue, however, that the law creates only a
duty to the general public, that the duty is to do what is reasonably
necessary to relieve the poor, and that how to perform the duty and
what resources to allocate to the problem of poverty are nonjusticiable
political questions. To determine whether the rights asserted in home-
less cases are judicially enforceable, courts should look to the language
of the statutory provision and the nature of the activity to be
performed.
1. Language of the Provision
There are several respects in which the language of a statutory provi-
sion may help determine whether it creates judicially enforceable indi-
vidual rights.
a. Whether the Conduct is Discretionary or Mandatory
A court should first distinguish between mandatory and discretion-
186. See supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
187. The existence of a legal right is a necessary element for both an injunction and
a writ of mandamus. See supra notes 20, 30 and accompanying texts.
188. Courts must construe the provision in question before determining whether
rights are judicially enforceable. L. TRIBE, supra note 37, § 3-17. See supra notes 51-52
and accompanying text.
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ary activities. Even if the conduct in question involves the exercise of
discretion, the court must recognize that some conduct is mandatory
though its means of execution are discretionary. 189  For example, a
statute might state that the government may provide shelter. Another
statute might provide that the government shall provide shelter, with-
out prescribing the manner in which that duty is to be performed.
Under the first statute, the duty is certainly discretionary. Under the
latter statute, however, the duty to provide shelter is mandatory; only
the manner of execution is discretionary. Under that statute, a court
that considers whether the government is satisfying its duty to provide
shelter, and not how the shelter is provided, may determine only
whether defendant performed the mandatory duty. A common exam-
ple of this distinction arises when a court, in determining whether a
government official has made a decision on a license application, will
not intrude into the discretionary matter of whether the application
should have been granted or denied.190 Thus, when the issue is
whether or not a government official has performed a mandatory duty,
even though the manner in which the official ultimately performs the
duty is left to his or her discretion, courts should not be reluctant to
review the official conduct.
b. Description of the Class of Beneficiaries
A duty to provide shelter and other services for the homeless is often
found in a statute or constitutional provision that creates an affirmative
duty to the poor.191 Whether affirmative governmental duties fit
189. See Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 539, 463 N.E.2d 588, 595, 475
N.Y.S.2d 247, 254 (1984).
190. See Stuart & Stuart, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 29 A.D.2d 176, 286 N.Y.S.2d
861 (1968). Similarly, though setting pay rates for police officers or selecting a particu-
lar route for a highway may be unreviewable discretionary acts, a court may determine
whether government officials followed specific nondiscretionary procedural require-
ments before making their discretionary decisions. Denver Police Protective Ass'n v.
City of Denver, 665 P.2d 150 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Orange County v. North Carolina
Dep't of Transp., 265 S.E.2d 890 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
191. Rights and duties may be expressed either as prohibitions or as affirmative
duties. Individual rights that are expressed as prohibitions generally involve limitations
on governmental powers and create rights to be free from government interference. The
Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments to the United States Constitution are
examples of rights created by absolute prohibitions on government activities. By their
prohibitory language those provisions create enforceable rights in every individual
within their coverage. It is difficult to imagine, however, a law expressed in prohibitory
terms that would create a right to shelter for the homeless.
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within the political question doctrine depends on how the state defines
the class of intended beneficiaries. When affirmative duties are ex-
pressed in mandatory terms, a government argument that the provision
creates only general duties to the public still may have facial validity
because governmental duties to the poor usually leave the manner in
which that duty is carried out to the discretion of the responsible pub-
liec officials. 192
The state may describe a class of beneficiaries in specific terms, such
as "each," "any," or "every" poor person, or "all" poor persons. For
example, a New Jersey statute requires that "public assistance shall be
rendered promptly to any needy person."' 93 The duty is to serve every
poor person covered by the statute, not just to address the problem of
poverty in general. The language compels the conclusion that the fail-
ure to provide shelter to "any needy person" is a violation of the
statute.
In contrast, an affirmative requirement to assist the poor may also
describe its intended beneficiaries in general terms. The New York
Constitution, for example, mandates governmental support for "the
needy."' 194 A Missouri statute requires relief for "poor persons."' 195
Only when dealing with this kind of general language can it plausibly
be argued that responsible officials may satisfy their duties by providing
limited services, disregarding some of the law's intended beneficiaries.
A government could argue that the duty to provide relief under those
provisions is analogous to a duty to conserve the peace, and that no
enforceable individual rights are created by such general duties.' 96 Un-
like a duty made applicable to every member of a class, the language of
a provision that describes its beneficiaries in general terms may not be
determinative of the question whether it creates judicially enforceable
rights.
192. See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
193. General Public Assistance Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. 44:8-120 (,West Supp. 1986).
194. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. See supra text accompanying note 71 for the full
text of this section.
195. Mo. REv. STAT. § 205.580 (1978). See supra text accompanying note 126 for
the full text of this provision.
196. See Weber v. City of Sachse, 591 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (reversing
injunction requiring increase in level of police protection).
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2. Nature of the Activity to Be Performed and the Impact on
Individual Beneficiaries
When statutory language is inconclusive, the court should look to
the nature of the governmental activity to determine whether general
public policy or individual rights should be enforced. Courts should
consider whether government action or inaction affects the individual
beneficiaries of the law. When a plaintiff asserts a claim against a gov-
ernment, alleging denial of an individual right, he or she should show
the impact of the denial on the individual beneficiaries. Otherwise, the
complaint may implicate only the performance of a duty owed to the
public in general. 97
This public policy/individual rights factor is related to, but different
from the question of standing. Though both issues require considera-
tion of the relationship between the interest of the plaintiff and the
claim being asserted, standing focuses more on the party seeking relief
than the claim asserted.' 98 The question of individual impact focuses
on these claims, and assumes that the suit has been brought by the
proper parties, that is, the intended beneficiaries of the law who are
affected by the alleged action or inaction.
It is helpful to distinguish claims alleging a complete denial of ser-
vice from claims alleging an insufficiency of service. Making that dis-
tinction, however, is not as easy as it might seem. For example,
plaintiffs could claim that a government is not providing enough shel-
197. One can compare the duty to assist the poor with other affirmative duties, such
as the duty to provide police protection and the duty to provide an education, com-
monly imposed on states or their subdivisions. An individual might assert a right to
safety and security and argue that the government should be required to provide more
police protection. If a person complains that the police consistently fail to respond to
calls at a particular home or neighborhood, a court may be able to measure the impact
on the affected individual(s) and determine that a right is being violated. If, however,
an individual claims that the police department is not providing safety and security
because there are not enough officers or insufficient street patrols, the plaintiff may not
be able to demonstrate personal impact. In this context, a court may determine that the
issue implicates only general public policy and not enforceable individual rights.
Parents might claim that their child is being deprived of an education and that the
government must provide more schooling. It is easy to determine whether a child is
being excluded from school, and such exclusion may be considered the denial of an
individual right. If parents complain that their child is not getting an adequate educa-
tion, the impact is not as clear. Unlike the claim of insufficient police protection, meas-
ures exist to test the benefits of a particular educational program. Educational
inadequacies may amount to an effective denial of service and, consequently, the denial
of an individual right.
198. L. TRIBE, supra note 37, § 3-17.
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ter space. This claim could be viewed in a variety of ways. The gov-
ernment could characterize a court's treatment of the claim as an
improper intrusion into the determination of how much money to allo-
cate for relief of the homeless. The court, however, need not decide the
monetary issue to determine whether adequate space exists. A com-
plaint of inadequate space could be based on the fact that some home-
less people have been turned away from shelters. That is a denial-of-
service issue. The same complaint, however, could mean that even
though every homeless person is sheltered, the shelters are too small
and overcrowded. This is a sufficiency-of-service issue.
a. Denial-of-Service Claims
If a homeless person or class alleges a denial of the basic necessities
of life such as shelter, food, security, and health care in violation of a
governmental duty to assist or relieve the poor, the individual impact
from the denial of service is obvious and potentially great. Thus, when
plaintiffs allege that a government has failed to provide some homeless
people with shelter and other basic necessities, and the court deter-
mines that a state poor law mandates those services, the court should
conclude with relative ease that the compliance issues are justiciable.
Plaintiffs are not merely attempting to litigate questions of public pol-
icy; they are claiming that the government is violating legal rights.
b. Sufficiency-of-Service Claims
Most poor laws leave the type or level of services that the govern-
ment is to provide to the discretion of public officials. When plaintiffs
complain about the sufficiency of services a government can assert the
political question doctrine. In this instance, the government will argue
that a court may not review discretionary choices either because the
decisions are explicitly committed to the legislative or executive
branches of government, or because they involve the application of
standards or the determination of broad policy issues that the judiciary
is not equipped to handle.199
If a court concludes that those issues are nonjusticiable, however,
even token performances would be unreviewable. It may be a legisla-
tive function to decide how much aid should be allocated to the poor,
but if that decision cannot be reviewed by the judiciary, the duty could
199. See supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
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be nullified by wholly inadequate performance.2 °" If a court finds that
the homeless poor are entitled to shelter or other services, then it
should view the issues that impact on the individuals as an attempt to
enforce individual rights.
Level-of-benefits claims under state poor laws clearly involve discre-
tionary choices. If the claim involves governmental conduct that has a
direct impact on plaintiffs, more is at stake than general questions of
public policy and resource allocation. Moreover, the courts are capa-
ble of interpreting the law and determining whether a government has
abused its discretion. Therefore, unless the state constitution clearly
and exclusively commits the issues to another branch of government,
such claims are justiciable.
The courts' first task in dealing with sufficiency claims is to deter-
mine the standard imposed by the statutory or constitutional provision.
Courts can decide the meaning of the terms "aid," "assist," "main-
tain," "relieve," and "support." At a minimum, those words mean
that the government is responsible to provide or make available serv-
ices that are necessary for survival. A court also could conclude that
the legislature intended a slightly higher standard, such as services that
are minimally necessary to allow a decent human existence. Going
even further, a court could determine that lawmakers intended that the
duty encompass not only short-term help, but assistance to allow the
homeless to better themselves and escape the cycle of homelessness.
This assistance includes services like life skills education, job training,
and assistance in finding employment or permanent housing.2"1
In addition to the language of the statutory or constitutional provi-
sion, a court may find guidance as to the intended service standard in
the legislative history or, perhaps with the aid of an expert witness, the
general historical context in which the legislature enacted the poor law.
If historical evidence is available, the court could consider what the
200. Even in New York, where the constitution expressly allows the legislature to
determine the manner and means of poor relief, a court found that minimal perform-
ance may amount to an effective denial of service and a violation of the constitutional
provision. McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986). See also Note,
supra note 100, arguing for a more expansive scope of judicial review of legislative dis-
cretion. Id. at 297.
201. One might argue that the wide range of choices available to courts in interpret-
ing such broad statutory language makes this question nonjusticiable. Courts in other
areas, however, have resolved such seemingly open-ended questions of legislative intent.
In the area of special education, for example, courts have interpreted the meaning of the
term "appropriate education." Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187-204
(1982).
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needs of the poor were at that time and how much relief the lawmakers
intended to provide.20 2
After a court decides what the duty means, it is capable of determin-
ing whether a government has abused its discretion.20 3 If the standard
is low-only those services necessary for human survival-a court can
determine compliance by common sense or, if the factual issues are
seriously disputed, with the help of expert testimony regarding the
services necessary to meet that standard. No expert is necessary if the
evidence shows that homeless people are being excluded from shelters
or that no food or medical care is available. A court might require
expert testimony if the issues are less startling, involving matters such
as safety, sanitation, alleged crowding in shelters, or the nutritional
value of food.
Whatever the standard, from bare survival to long-term assistance,
pure policy and resource allocation questions may be left to the discre-
tion of officials charged with the duty to the poor. The line between
justiciable and nonjusticiable compliance questions should be drawn
between issues that have direct impact on whether beneficiaries of the
law are receiving services necessary to meet the standard, and issues
that do not have such impact. The line should not be drawn to remove
all quantitative and qualitative decisions from judicial consideration,
because the number and size of shelters, the safety and security in shel-
ters, and the amount and nature of food or health care are all issues
that affect the well-being of the law's beneficiaries. Pure policy and
resource allocation questions that relate solely to how the government
provides the services, rather than the amount or nature of the services
provided, are nonjusticiable. These nonjusticiable issues might include
how much money to spend to help the homeless, whether the govern-
ment should provide services directly instead of contracting with pri-
vate agencies, and whether to provide in kind services or establish a
cash or voucher system. If the government is fulfilling its obligation to
provide or make available the services required under the law, a court
should not be concerned with the resolution of those questions. In gen-
eral, the court must determine whether it is being asked to resolve
broad policy questions or whether plaintiffs are seeking enforcement of
202. See Note, supra note 100, for an historical review concerning the context of the
adoption of New York's constitutional provision mandating aid for the poor. Id. at
285-96.
203. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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particular rights bestowed on them by the legislature. 2°
B. Fashioning Appropriate Remedies in Homeless Cases
After a court has found a legal right to shelter or other services for
the homeless, and a violation of that right, it must consider the nature
and extent of the remedy. In a homeless case in which a government
violates its duty to provide the services or level of services required by
law, the only adequate remedies are injunction and mandamus. 20 5
Only these remedies are adequate because the government may be im-
mune from a damage remedy, and if not, a damage award would not
force it to change its practices in the future.
1. The Competing Interests of the Parties and the Court
Plaintiffs' goals for a complete and detailed remedial order will often
be at odds with the desires of governments and the inclinations of
courts. Homeless plaintiffs may want the court to provide detailed di-
rections covering administration matters to a government. These mat-
ters might include the total number of shelter beds, the maximum
number of beds per shelter, the amount of space per shelter bed, the
availability of toileting and hygienic facilities, the separation for secur-
ity reasons of different groups of homeless people into different shel-
ters, the provision of shelter and child care during the day, and a wide
variety of other important issues. Government defendants, on the
other hand, are likely to prefer freedom from court interference. Even
though courts have broad discretion to remedy violations of law, they
are often reluctant to issue detailed injunctive relief. State courts with
relatively little institutional litigation experience may be particularly
reluctant to impose broad and detailed remedies that intrude into the
affairs of the executive and legislative branches of government.20 6
204. See Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 536-37, 463 N.E.2d 588, 593-94,
475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 252-53 (1984). The West Virginia Supreme Court stated in Hodge v.
Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983): "Inherent in the republican form of govern-
ment established by our State Constitution is a concept of due process that ensures that
the people receive the benefit of legislative enactments." Id. at 247.
205. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
206. For example, in Graham v. Schoemehl, No. 854-00035 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Oct. 4,
1985), when the court overruled the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion, it expressly reserved the question whether it had jurisdiction to issue injunctive
relief against the government defendants.
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2. Determination of Appropriate Remedies
Three basic principles should guide the courts in the determination
of appropriate remedies. First, courts have broad remedial powers to
provide relief from violations of law committed by the other branches
of government. The use of this power, however, must be tempered by
consideration of two additional principles. The nature and scope of the
remedy should be no more extensive than the nature and scope of the
right violated. In addition, to respect the separation of powers doc-
trine, the remedy should intrude no more than necessary into the af-
fairs of the coordinate branches of government.
To limit the remedy to the violation and to minimize intrusion, a
court should avoid interference with discretionary matters. For exam-
ple, when a government official fails to perform a mandatory duty or a
nondiscretionary component of a discretionary duty, the court can or-
der compliance without directing the method and manner of perform-
ance.2 °7 If the court finds that a government is failing to provide
shelter or another service it is legally obligated to provide, the court
can simply order the government to provide the service. This type of
order leaves the decisions of how to provide the service and how much
money to spend to the government. Similarly, if the violation involves
a two-dimensional issue such as the eligibility for services of a particu-
lar group of people, the court can order the government to reverse its
position and make the members of the group eligible. The mere finding
of a failure to perform a legal duty or an abuse of discretion should not
be enough to require a detailed remedy.
When government conduct involves the exercise of discretion, there
are several remedial options that courts should consider before impos-
ing a detailed and intrusive remedy.2"8 In its decision, a court can de-
scribe how the government is failing to comply with its statutory duty
and simply order compliance, in the hope that the government will
correct the problem itself.20 9 Going a small step further, a court can
give the government an opportunity to develop its own solution and
time to bring itself into compliance.210 Courts can also allow or compel
207. See supra notes 55, 110-13, 156-59 and accompanying texts.
208. See Coffin, supra note 57, at 984, 994, 995-96; Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note
57, at 493-94; Special Project, supra note 58, at 796-813.
209. See Coffin, supra note 57, at 984, 994; Special Project, supra note 58, at 797-
800.
210. See Coffin, supra note 57, at 984, 994; Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 57, at
493; Special Project, supra note 58, at 802-95.
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negotiations between the parties for the formulation of remedial
scheme.211
3. Detailed and Intrusive Remedies
When evidence of a government's past performance shows that a de-
tailed remedial order is necessary to compel compliance, or when a
government has been given an opportunity to comply but continues
failing to perform, a court must impose its own solution. The court,
however, should consider that a detailed court-imposed remedy is less
likely to achieve satisfactory performance than a remedy selected by
the government itself or negotiated between the parties.2 12 When the
government is involved in determining the appropriate remedy, it is
more likely to be committed to making the remedy work and less likely
to appeal.
Evidence at trial may show that past governmental performance ne-
cessitates a detailed and intrusive remedy in order to achieve compli-
ance. In some cases the government may fail to perform its duty to aid
the homeless because it does not understand the nature of the duty or it
does not perceive the need for governmental intervention. If the court
sees no evidence to suggest future noncompliance, it should give the
government an opportunity to perform its duty under a general reme-
dial order. In other cases, however, government defendants may rec-
ognize their duty to provide shelter and other necessary services to the
homeless, but decide to ignore that duty because they want to spend
their money on other, nonobligatory services. In these circumstances a
court might conclude that only a detailed and intrusive remedy would
be effective.
Detailed remedial orders are also necessary when less intrusive rem-
edies have failed to achieve compliance. A court may initially order a
government to provide shelter or other specified services to the home-
less. If that order fails to achieve satisfactory compliance, the court
should consider more detailed and intrusive remedies such as those dis-
cussed above.
211. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 57, at 493; Special Project, supra note 58,
at 809-12.
212. Compare Graham v. Schoemehl, No. 854-00035 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 15, 1985),
in which the parties negotiated a detailed consent decree, with McCain v. Koch, 127
Misc. 2d 23, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and
modified in part, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986), and Dukes v. Durante, 192
Conn. 207, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984), two cases in which the appellate courts overturned
detailed court-imposed remedies. See supra notes 172-85 and accompanying text.
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4. Judicial Competency to Determine Appropriate
Detailed Remedies
With one major limitation, courts can decide how to help the home-
less in the same manner as a legislative or executive body. A legisla-
ture or executive agency may have the power to do more than the law
requires, but courts must limit their remedial strategies to the rights
and duties that the government violated. Courts must first refer to the
analysis they undertook at the liability stage, examine the rights and
duties created by the relevant statute or constitutional provision, and
determine the proper substantive standard.213 This analysis will estab-
lish the limits of the court's remedial power. The scope of the remedy
depends on whether the government's duty is to provide services neces-
sary to ensure the survival of homeless people, services necessary to
allow a decent human existence, or services necessary to assist the
homeless to better their current situation and break the cycle of
homelessness.
By referring to evidence taken at the liability stage, the court deter-
mines the nature and level of need that is not being met by the govern-
ment. As part of its liability analysis the court should determine which
of the required services the government is either failing to provide or
providing in insufficient quality or quantity.
Once the court has determined what the law requires and how the
government is failing to satisfy its legal duties, the court should con-
sider remedial alternatives that will fill the service gap left by the gov-
ernment's noncompliance. If the parties have not presented evidence
regarding an appropriate remedy during the trial, the court should con-
duct a separate hearing on the issue of relief. Guided by equitable prin-
ciples, the court will' perform the functions ordinarily performed by
executive or legislative officials. In the words of the Supreme Court,
the court will have to fashion a remedy by "adjusting and reconciling
public and private needs.",214 The court should receive evidence on the
remedial question from both plaintiffs and defendants, and in some
cases, from court-appointed experts and the public. The court should
also consider appointing a special master to hear the evidence and
make recommendations regarding the appropriate remedy. The court
will have to decide many issues if it seeks to impose a detailed remedy
compelling a government to satisfy its duty to aid the homeless, but
213. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
214. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
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with sufficient evidentiary resources, there is no reason the court can-
not make these decisions in order to ensure life, health, and safety to
homeless persons.
CONCLUSION
Litigation under state poor laws can provide meaningful relief for
the homeless. Many state constitutional and statutory provisions cre-
ate mandatory duties to relieve or assist the poor. At a minimum,
those duties must be interpreted to encompass the basic need of the
homeless-shelter.
Although government entitles and officials may argue that the per-
formance of their duties involves nonjusticiable political questions,
courts should conclude that poor laws create enforceable individual
rights. Even when the performance of governmental duties to the poor
involves the exercise of discretion, courts can compel compliance in
one of two ways. When the government is completely failing to pro-
vide shelter or other required services, the court can simply order the
government to provide the services without specifying the manner in
which it must provide them. When the government is complying in
part by providing shelter or other services in insufficient quantity or
quality, the court can order full compliance if the exercise of discretion
is not exclusively committed to the executive or legislative branch of
government and the conduct of the responsible officials is an abuse of
discretion.
While courts possess extensive remedial powers, they should exercise
those powers with caution. Courts should avoid relief in homeless
cases that is broader than necessary to meet the violation, and should
allow the government to make the discretionary choices it was origi-
nally entrusted to make. When necessary, however, courts have both
the authority and the competence to devise detailed remedial schemes
to accomplish the objectives of the law and provide meaningful relief
for the homeless.
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